State of Utah v. Seruka Tiliaia : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
State of Utah v. Seruka Tiliaia : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Christine F. Soltis; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for State of Utah.
Jennifer K. Gowans; Randall K. Spencer; Fillmore Spencer, LLC; Attorneys for Seuka Tiliaia.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Tiliaia, No. 20041030 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5391
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
SERUKA TILIAIA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20041030-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION, JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND ORDER FOR 
COMMITMENT, JANUARY 10, 2003, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS. APPELLANT IS INCARCERATED. 
Christine F. Soltis (3039) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Jennifer K. Gowans (7538) 
Randall K. Spencer (6992) 
Fillmore Spencer, LLC 
Jamestown Square 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for State of Utah Attorneys for Seruka Tiliaia 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
FILL. 
UTAH APPELLATE ( 
APR 1 1 LwO 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
SERUKA TILIAIA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20041030-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION, JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND ORDER FOR 
COMMITMENT, JANUARY 10, 2003, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS. APPELLANT IS INCARCERATED. 
Christine F. Soltis (3039) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Jennifer K. Gowans (7538) 
Randall K Spencer (6992) 
Fillmore Spencer, LLC 
Jamestown Square 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for State of Utah Attorneys for Seruka Tiliaia 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE SEVEREST 
SANCTION OF EXCLUDING THE CRITICAL TESTIMONY OF 
DEFENSE WITNESS, MARCO ETSITTY, WAS NOT AN ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION 3 
A. The State knew about Marco Etsitty and his testimony 3 
B. The State does not, and indeed cannot, justify the severest 
sanction of precluding Tiliaia from presenting his only 
defense 4 
C. The State's "failure to marshal" argument is misapplied . . . . 6 
D. If trial counsel willfully committed a discovery violation, 
deficient performance is established 12 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT JAMES 
STORM'S STATEMENT WAS NOT AN EXCITED UTTERANCE 
WAS INCORRECT; AND ITS FINDING THAT THERE WAS "NO 
EVIDENCE" THAT THE UTTERANCE WAS SPONTANEOUS IS 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 13 
n i . THE STATE HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN THAT THE 
PROSECUTOR'S MISSTATEMENT OF THE EVIDENCE WAS 
HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 17 
IV. THE STATE HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN THAT THE 
PROSECUTOR'S INCORRECT INSTRUCTION REGARDING 
THE JURY'S ROLE WAS HARMLESS 20 
CONCLUSION 23 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081 (Utah App. 1998) 4-5 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) 5 
Bowlingv. Vose, 3 F.3d 559 (1st Cir. 1993) 5 
Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980) 4 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) 4 
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.3d 314 (Utah 1945) 4 
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1985) 4 
Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347 (Utah 1936) 5 
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1994) 13 
Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991) 4 
Mont v. Egelhoff 518 U.S. 37 (1996) 4 
People of Territory of Guam v. Quichocho, 973 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992) 20 
ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 
(Utah 1997) 6, 14 
Pulinario v. Goord, 118 Fed. Appx. 554 (2nd Cir. 2004) 5 
Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, 974 P.2d 306 6 
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) 12-13 
Salt Lake City v. Alires, 2000 UT App 244 13 
ii 
Salt Lake City v. Hoskins, 2005 UT App 187 6 
State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72 (Utah 1981) 6 
State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, 76 P.3d 1165 6 
State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1989) 13 
State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977) 17, 23 
State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981) 4 
State v. Honie, 2005 UT 4, 57 P.3d 977 6 
State v. Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, 113 P.3d 998 19 
State v. Martin, 44 P.3d 805 (Utah 2002) 5 
State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986) 17, 22 
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 108 S. Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed. 798 (1988) 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 
United States v. Duffaut,3U F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2002) 21 
United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 1999) 5 
United States v. Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d 1002 (1st Cir. 1995) 5 
United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570 (1st Cir. 1994) 20 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) 4 
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) 4 
United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1991) 21 
Walker v. Hood, 679 F. Supp. 372 (D.N.Y. 1988) 5 
Walker v. Union Pac. R.R., 844 P.2d 335 (Utah App. 1992) 6 
iii 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) 4 
West Valley City v. Hutto, 5 P.3d 1 (Utah App. 2000) 14 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
SERUKA TILIAIA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20041030-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The critical evidence in this case was inconsistent. Witnesses' testimonies were 
materially different from each other and from what they told police immediately 
following the incident. Witnesses' recollections materially changed over time, and were 
influenced and thereby contaminated by tampering interviews (see, e.g., Br. Appt. 10-13) 
and subsequent discussions with others. Therefore, any trial errors were particularly 
harmful and undoubtedly impacted the verdict in the context of this inconsistent evidence. 
Thus, because of rulings that precluded Tiliaia from presenting his complete 
defense, false and inflammatory statements the prosecutor made during closing 
arguments, and ineffective assistance of counsel, Tiliaia was deprived of his right to a fair 
trial and is in prison today for crimes he likely would have been acquitted for otherwise. 
The State has failed to demonstrate that Marco Etsitty was a surprise witness or 
that the State would have been prejudiced by his testimony. The State has also presented 
no argument to justify the severest sanction of witness preclusion for alleged discovery 
violations. The State's "failure to marshal" argument also does not apply in this context 
as the correct legal standard is "abuse of discretion." Moreover, if indeed defense 
counsel willfully committed discovery violations that resulted in preclusion of a critical 
witness, ineffective assistance of counsel is established. 
The State's general accusation that Tiliaia failed to meet the marshaling 
requirement, which theme runs throughout the State's brief, is without merit. The State 
misapplies this legal standard in the context of specific arguments to which it does not 
apply. Where it does apply, Tiliaia has thoroughly met his burden. Indeed, Tiliaia's 
Statement of Facts, wherein he was mindful of his burden and listed every fact material or 
even arguably relevant to his arguments, totaled twenty-three pages in his opening brief. 
In contrast, the State deigned to provide facts to this Court totaling less than eight pages. 
The State misconstrues the evidence relative to James Storm's statement that he 
had just seen Zeke shoot Kehndra, claiming that the statement was not an excited 
utterance because it was in answer to a question and thus, not spontaneous. The evidence 
does not support this claim. Also, the trial court's ruling to exclude this evidence was 
incorrect, and its finding that there was "no evidence" to support its spontaneity is clearly 
erroneous. All of the material evidence demonstrated the statement's spontaneity. 
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Finally, the State has failed to meet its burden that the false and inflammatory 
statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments were harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE STATE FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE SEVEREST SANCTION OF 
EXCLUDING THE CRITICAL TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS, 
MARCO ETSITTY, WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
A, The State knew about Marco Etsitty and his testimony.1 
The State claims that the trial court correctly precluded Marco Etsitty from 
testifying in Tiliaia's defense because he was a surprise witness and defense counsel 
violated a discovery order in not disclosing him. Notably, the State does not claim that it 
would have been prejudiced by Etsitty's testimony. The State hardly acknowledges the 
undisputed fact that the State knew about Etsitty and the substance of his testimony even 
before the defense did (R504:442-53; R505:464, 471). The State also does not 
acknowledge the fact that Etsitty was disclosed by both parties on a jointly prepared jury 
questionnaire as a potential witness prior to trial (R504:442-53; R505:464, 471). 
By definition, Etsitty was not a "surprise witness" even if the defense had 
wanted him to be. Indeed, the State sought to exclude Etsitty precisely because not only 
was Etsitty known to the State, but so was the substance of his testimony (R504:442-53; 
lEtsitty would have testified as an eyewitness in Tiliaia's defense that the person 
shooting toward the porch was not Tiliaia but a tall black man, and that Ezekiel House 
and Rafael Haney threatened to kill him if he went to the police (R505:480). 
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R505:464, 471). The State also has not and cannot demonstrate any tactical advantage 
Tiliaia would have gained from failing to disclose Etsitty to the State. 
Therefore, assuming without agreeing that Tiliaia's trial counsel willfully failed 
to disclose Marco Etsitty as a witness for the defense, the State still cannot show that it 
would have been prejudiced by his testimony or that, if there was a discovery violation, 
Tiliaia might have gained some tactical advantage from it. Accordingly, the State can 
demonstrate no prejudice, and the sanction was disproportionate to the alleged violation. 
B. The State does not, and indeed cannot, justify the severest sanction of 
precluding Tiliaia from presenting his only defense. 
Assuming arguendo that omitting Marco Etsitty from the defense's formal 
witness list was a discovery violation, notwithstanding the fact that the State interviewed 
Etsitty, disclosed him to the defense, and listed him as a potential witness on a jury 
questionnaire, the State simply ignores the precedent cited in Tiliaia's opening brief 
holding that punitive restrictions against the right of the accused to present evidence in 
his defense are inappropriate except in the rarest of circumstances, and that alternative 
measures that do not compromise a criminal defendant's fundamental right to present 
evidence should be imposed. See, BRIEF OF APPELLANT ("Br. Appt"), 27-32.2 
2E.g, United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998); Mont v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 
37 (1996); Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 
(1988); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1985); Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 
(1980); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 
284 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1981); Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945); Astill v Clark, 956 P.2d 
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Further, in light of the disputed and inconsistent nature of the evidence in this 
case, and the fact that Etsitty was threatened if he reported his testimony to the police, this 
evidence was not "merely cumulative." See, Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 349 
(Utah 1936) ("[I]n a case where there is so much variation in testimony, the observations 
of more witnesses might be more than merely cumulative"); State v. Martin, 44 P.3d 805, 
816 (Utah 2002) (holding that because evidence that the victim was irresponsible was not 
admitted during trial, the evidence was not merely cumulative). 
The State's zeal to exclude the testimony of an eyewitness whose life was 
threatened if he told the truth, and who the State admittedly dismissed as having "no 
evidentiary value to the State" (R505:472) seems misplaced. See, Berger v United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (The prosecutor's duty "in a criminal prosecution is not 
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done"). 
However, it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to exclude a witness who 
would have testified not only that he saw someone other than Tiliaia shooting towards the 
house, but that he was threatened if he reported this information to the police (R505:480). 
Accordingly, the State cannot show that precluding Etsitty's critical testimony was a 
justifiable sanction under the particular facts of this case. 
1081 (Utah App. 1998); United States v. Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d 1002 (Pl Cir. 1995); 
Bowling v. Vose, 3 F.3d 559 (1st Cir. 1993); Pulinario v. Goord, 118 Fed. Appx. 554 (2 
Cir. 2004); United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 1999); Walker v. Hood, 
679 F. Supp. 372 (D.N.Y. 1988). 
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C. The State's "failure to marshal" argument is misapplied. 
The State also argues that Tiliaia failed to marshal the evidence relative to the 
trial court's ruling to exclude Etsitty from testifying. BRIEF OF APPELLEE (wwBr. Appe."), 
17-24. In doing so, the State misapplies an incorrect legal standard.3 '*Although the 
admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law, a trial court's decision to admit 
or exclude specific evidence [is reviewed] for an abuse of discretion." State v. Cruz-
Meza, 2003 UT 32, f 8, 76 P.3d 1165. 
In an abuse of discretion analysis, this court first determines if it was error for 
the trial court to exclude the evidence, and then if the error was harmful. Salt Lake City v. 
Hoskins, 2005 UT App 187. It is the proponent's burden to show he was prejudiced by 
the trial court's decision. State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981); Rehn v Rehn. 
1999 UT App 41, 974 P.2d 306, 314 (explaining that an error is harmful if "absent the 
error, there is a sufficiently high likelihood of a different outcome, undermining our 
confidence in the result" (quoting State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4,1J54, 57 P.3d 977)). Further, 
it is an abuse of discretion if the trial court's decision to exclude a witness is "induced by 
a misperception of the law." Walker v. Union Pac. R.R., 844 P.2d 335 (Utah App. 1992). 
Tiliaia thoroughly demonstrated the trial court's abuse of discretion and resulting 
3The State relies on ProMax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah 
App.), cert denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997), where this Court stated, "[W]e review the 
trial court's findings of fact for clear error, reversing only where the finding is against the 
clear weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made." ProMax has no relevance to the issue of witness preclusion. 
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prejudice in his opening brief. See, Br. Appt. at 27-35. Thus, the State's arguments miss 
the mark. The trial court abused its discretion in excluding Marco Etsitty because he was 
not a surprise witness (R504:442-53; R505:464, 471), he was critical to Tiliaia's defense 
(R505:480), and under these circumstances, the severest sanction of preventing Tiliaia 
from presenting his complete defense was harmful and inappropriate, violating his right 
to a fair trial by prevent him from developing all the relevant facts. Taylor at 408. 
Therefore, Tiliaia was prejudiced by the trial court's abuse of discretion. In the 
context of much disputed and inconsistent testimony, Etsitty's testimony would have 
demonstrated that someone other than Tiliaia committed the crimes. In fact, Etsitty's 
description of the porch shooter matched Zeke House (R505:480), the one person who the 
State claimed had no gun and could not have committed the crimes, notwithstanding his 
apparent anxiety to get rid of the guns (R504:311-18, 375). Etsitty's testimony, therefore, 
would have planted reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors that Tiliaia committed the 
crimes such that there is a high likelihood of a different outcome. Etsitty's additional 
testimony that Zeke threatened him if he went to the police with this evidence would 
almost certainly have resulted in a different verdict (R505:480). 
Further, the trial court's reliance on Taylor v. Illinois, supra, (R505.468, 476) as 
legal justification for its decision is incorrect. See, Br. Appt. 30-32 (demonstrating that 
Taylor only supports witness preclusion in the rarest of cases where counsel's conduct is 
clearly blatant, willful, and unethical). 
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The State's claim that the facts in Taylor are 'less egregious" than the facts here 
is puzzling. Br. Appe. at 27. Defense counsel in Taylor blatantly lied to the trial court 
when he averred that he was first informed of a defense witness during the State's case in 
chief. Not only had the prosecution in Taylor never heard of the witness before, but it 
was proven that defense counsel had met with the witness the week before trial and prior 
to filing an amended witness list, and had deliberately failed to disclose the witness to 
obtain a tactical advantage. Moreover, the witness's testimony was fabricated. These 
egregious facts led to the "inescapable" conclusion that the defense had violated ethical 
rules to gain a tactical advantage. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. at 403, 405. 
In contrast, the State in this case knew about Etsitty and interviewed him prior to 
disclosing him to the defense (R504:442-53, 471). Unlike the witness in Taylor, Etsitty's 
testimony was not fabricated. Both parties had to prepare witness lists from over 150 
potential witnesses - with the defense not knowing what evidence the State was going to 
present or what testimony they might need to impeach, and the State not knowing who it 
might need to call in rebuttal after the defense rested (R504:444-45; R505:464, 471). 
Moreover, Defense counsel candidly informed the State the week before trial 
that she might call witnesses not explicitly disclosed on the witness list (R505:468), and 
both parties expressly and formally reserved the right to call additional witnesses not 
listed (R505:463; Br. Appt., Addendum B). This reservation makes sense in light of the 
sheer number of potential witnesses and the inconsistent and evolving testimonies. These 
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facts are not more "egregious" than those in Taylor, where defense counsel undisputably 
lied to obtain a tactical advantage, by any stretch of the imagination. 
Unlike Taylor, defense counsel did not lie to the trial court or to the prosecution 
about when they discovered Etsitty as a witness. Indeed, the State knew about Etsitty and 
disclosed him to the defense and as a potential witness on the jury questionnaire jointly 
prepared by both parties (R504:442-53, 471; R505:463-64, 468, 471). Thus, the State's 
claim that these facts are more egregious than the blatant and proven lie promulgated in 
Taylor for the clear purpose of obtaining a tactical advantage, is untenable. 
In its failure to marshal argument (that does not apply in determining whether 
the trial court abused its discretion), the State also fails to acknowledge the bases for the 
trial court's ruling. The court's findings and conclusions in support of that ruling were as 
follows: 
1. The trial court relied on Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) 
(R505:468, 476) to justify witness preclusion. 
2. Etsitty was subpoenaed by the defense on October 25, 2002, about three 
weeks prior to trial, so the defense knew it was going to call him as a 
witness (R505:468, 471, 476). 
3. Because this was a homicide trial, there was an expectation that both 
sides would be well prepared (R505:477). The defense was "extremely 
well prepared, they have had their questioning and their total preparation 
very well handled, indicating that they have known all along how they 
wanted to try this case." Id. Therefore, it appeared that the defense's 
failure to disclose Etsitty on their witness list was "a choice", especially 
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since he was subpoenaed three weeks prior to trial. Id4 
The trial court's did not rely on the entire case history of discovery, as the State 
does. Br. Appe. 17-24. The trial court also made these findings and conclusions 
notwithstanding that the State knew about Etsitty and both the State and the defense 
expressly reserved the right to call additional witnesses not formally included on their 
respective witness lists (R505:463; Br. Appt. Addendum B), there were over 150 
potential witnesses, and stories about key events were as varied as the number of 
witnesses (R504:442-453; R505:459-487). 
Defense counsel argued that presentation of the defense depended in large part 
upon the State's case in chief; therefore, decisions about which witnesses to call and 
which to exclude were constantly being made (R504:442-453; R505:459-487). The State 
also admitted that it knew about Etsitty - that it had reviewed a transcript of Etsitty's 
interview with police, dismissed it as having "no evidentiary value to the State", and 
disclosed it to the defense (R505:472). The additional fact that defense counsel candidly 
disclosed to the State the week prior to trial that she might call additional witnesses not 
included on the witness list additionally supports a finding that the defense had no intent 
to surprise the State, but was simply unsure of how the evidence would unfold - as was 
4In an apparent although unsuccessful attempt to meet the high standard 
established in Taylor, the court made a 180 degree reversal here from its previous finding 
that defense counsels' preparation was "unprofessional" and last-minute (R505:477), 
finding that defense counsels' preparation was now "excellent" and "a choice." 
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the State (R505:468).5 These facts, most of which the State does not acknowledge, show 
that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Etsitty's testimony. 
Further, even if the clearly erroneous standard applied here rather than the abuse 
of discretion standard, the facts relative to the entire pretrial "discovery procedure" (Br. 
Appe. at 18) "marshaled" by the State had no bearing on the trial court's decision to 
preclude Etsitty from testifying (R505:468, 471, 476). The trial court specifically stated 
that she was "very lenient about allowing late disclosure of witnesses", and that if defense 
counsel had formally disclosed Etsitty just the weekend prior to trial, her ruling would 
have been different (R505:475). The State ignores this fact. 
The State further misrepresents the trial court's statements, claiming that the 
court "noted that defendant's original witness list appeared to have little meaning in that 
the defense intended to call only two of the 15 listed witnesses" Br. Appe. at 21; 
compare, R505:447-48 (the trial court states only that failure to provide a final updated 
witness list prior to trial suggests "preparation for trial was done the weekend before trial 
and that by the time of the pretrial back in early November, none of these decisions had 
been made"; this statement is obviously inconsistent with the trial court's subsequent 
finding that defense counsel were well prepared (R505:477)). 
The State further misrepresents that the trial court "noted that over 150 potential 
5The State also fails to acknowledge the fact that initially, the trial court was 
persuaded that the parties' listing of Etsitty on the jointly-prepared jury questionnaire 
provided sufficient notice to the State that he might be called as a witness (R504:445). 
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witnesses were involved in the case, which required counsel to responsibly pare down its 
potential trial witnesses", and claims this "fact" was not marshaled. Br. Appe. at 21; 
compare, R505:471-72 (the trial court makes no such statement); see also, Br. Appt. at 
22-4 (marshaling the fact that there were over 140 witnesses on the jury questionnaire). 
Thus, many of the facts the State claims Tiliaia failed to marshal either were 
marshaled, are not "facts," or had no relevance to the trial court's decision; and all of the 
facts relied upon by the trial court in precluding Etsitty were presented in Tiliaia's 
opening brief, including many that the State claims Tiliaia failed to marshal, and others 
that the State ignored.6 Accordingly, the State's failure to marshal argument not only has 
no application, but is without merit. 
D. If trial counsel willfully committed a discovery violation, deficient 
performance is established. 
The State wants it both ways. On one hand, it claims that Tiliaia's trial counsel 
strategically and improperly violated the trial court's discovery order, warranting the 
severe sanction of preclusion of a critical defense witness. Br. Appe. 16-28. On the 
other, it argues that a strategic decision to violate a court order is sound trial strategy. Br. 
Appe. at 30-1. Such convoluted reasoning would not only set poor precedent, but ignores 
the U.S. Supreme Court's holding cited in Tiliaia's opening brief that if a strategic 
decision is unreasonable, it constitutes deficient performance. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 
6See, Br. Appt. at 21-24 for a detailed outline of the facts, law, and discussion 
surrounding the trial court's decision to exclude Etsitty. 
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U.S. 470, 480-81 (2000); Br. Appt. at 37. Under Flores, a strategic decision to violate a 
court's discovery order such that witness preclusion will result is not reasonable. 
The State also argues that Tiliaia cannot establish prejudice, claiming Tiliaia 
would have to establish the outcome of trial "would have been different" if Etsitty had 
testified. Notwithstanding that the correct standard is not "would have been different" 
but a "reasonable probability of a different result" {see, Br. Appt. at 36; / e , Kyles v 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1994)), and notwithstanding the additional fact that the State 
fought very hard to exclude a witness whose testimony the State now claims was "merely 
cumulative" (Br. Appe. 31), Tiliaia has already established prejudice under the abuse of 
discretion standard reiterated above. See, Br. Appt. 32-3; Sections I A-C, supra.1 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT JAMES 
STORM'S STATEMENT WAS NOT AN EXCITED UTTERANCE WAS 
INCORRECT; AND ITS FINDING THAT THERE WAS "NO 
EVIDENCE" THAT THE UTTERANCE WAS SPONTANEOUS IS 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
A trial court's legal conclusion about the admissibility of evidence is reviewed 
for correctness. Salt Lake City v. Alires, 2002 UT App 224, [^8. The trial court's ruling 
will not be disturbed absent clear error. State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Utah 1989). 
Again, the State argues that Tiliaia did not marshal all the evidence relative to 
the trial court's ruling. Tiliaia did marshal all of the relevant facts (see, Br. Appt. 20-1), 
7The State's speculation about whether Etsitty would have "shown up" is irrelevant 
and improper at this juncture. The record is that Etsitty was precluded from testifying 
because of an alleged discovery violation, no more, no less. 
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notwithstanding the State's misplaced reliance on ProMax Development, supra, a case 
that does not involve the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. Br. 
Appe. 32-5. The State's argument lacks both merit and legal support. 
As the State concedes, the only issue is whether Storm made the statement while 
he "was under the stress of excitement caused by the event" (Br. Appe. 36, citing West 
Valley City v. Hutto, 2000 UT App 188). What the State fails to acknowledge is the 
evidence Tiliaia marshaled (Br. Appt. 20-1), and the trial court's finding that there was 
"no evidence" to show that the statement was spontaneous (R505:554). This finding is 
clearly erroneous and the trial court's ruling is incorrect. 
The only evidence in support of the trial court's finding that the statement was 
not spontaneous was an unexplored discrepancy about when Storm made the statement 
(R505:543-44, 546, 549). Martinez testified that Storm called him 10-12 minutes after 
the shooting; but on cross examination, he admitted telling police that he did not speak 
with Storm until the day after the shooting. Id. However, this discrepancy was not 
explored - it was not allowed and Martinez was never given the opportunity to explain 
the discrepancy during the State's zealous efforts to keep out any evidence that someone 
besides Tiliaia had committed the crimes (R505:543-49). 
And although the court found that Storm's statement was in response to a 
question and thus not spontaneous, the record does not support this finding and it is 
clearly erroneous. The relevant exchange relied upon by both the trial court and the State 
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was as follows: 
COUNSEL-. The conversation that you had with Jam.es Storm, was it calm aad 
collected? 
MARTINEZ:No. 
Q: Was he making relaxed statements or was he blurting things out? 
A: He was blurting things out. 
Q: Were you asking him questions? 
A: I just - yeah, he just - yeah. Yes. 
Q: Did he tell you what had excited him? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What did he tell you had excited him9 
MS. WISSLER: Objection, your Honor, calls for hearsay -
THE COURT: Sustained. 
(R505:548). 
This exchange does not show that Storm's utterance that he saw Zeke shoot 
Kehndra was made in response to a question. Contrary to the State's questionable 
mtetpieta&KV of \\s<i fowgowvg, \H\«\l\g,Vvte*vu\g) ex.dMK\g£ (B* &Wt 3>7 ) wvi tte. tt«A 
court's finding, the fact that Martinez asked Storm questions does not mean that he was 
asked, "What excited you?" 
If a person blurts out, "I just saw John shoot Jane!", the person to whom that 
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statement is made will naturally ask questions. Martinez never testified that he asked 
Storm, "What excited you?" Despite the trial court's ruling and the State's 
misrepresentation that Martinez asked Storm why he was so excited (Br. Appe. 37), the 
evidence does not support this finding or interpretation. Neither does common sense. 
Martinez testified that Storm sounded upset, startled, and was stuttering - which 
was not normal for Storm (R505:545). Martinez further testified that Storm did not sound 
like himself and was "screaming, yelling" (R505:546). Screaming and yelling suggests 
substantial stress and excitement. It also suggests spontaneity. Storm had not only just 
witnessed a traumatic event where several people were hurt and one person was killed, 
but he saw the perpetrators commit the crimes. Even if this statement was made the 
following day, which does not appear to be the case,8 Storm was arguably still under the 
stress and excitement of the shooting even then. Yet the trial court inexplicably ruled 
Storm's utterance was not made under the stress or excitement of the shooting 
(R505:554-55). 
The State's seeming lackadaisical recitation of the facts on this point suggest 
that the shooting was not traumatic to the eyewitnesses because of their sheer number; 
and therefore, because 50 or so people had just witnessed a shooting, they did not 
8The call was made 10-12 minutes (R505:543-44, 546) after the shooting and 
Storm was "walking away from the party and needed someone to pick him up" 
(R505:553). Storm was "screaming" and "yelling" (R505:546). Martinez was never 
given the opportunity to explain the time discrepancy (R505:549-50). 
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experience any stress or excitement, but "just wanted to leave." Br. Appe. 37. Without 
citing to the record, the State claims Storm was asked "why he was so excited (a strange 
question if indeed Martinez fled the same shooting only minutes before)". Id. As noted 
above, the record does not support this misinterpretation of the evidence. 
Finally, the State argues that Tiliaia "presented no evidence establishing Storm's 
actions during the [12-minute] interval" after the shooting. Br. Appe. 38. This argument 
is disingenuous. It ignores the State's zealous and successful efforts to prevent any facts 
about what Storm said or did from coming into evidence (R505:543-49). Defense 
counsel was simply not permitted to elicit this information. The State cannot now benefit 
from a purported lack of evidence that it is responsible for. Moreover, the fact that Storm 
had the presence of mind to call his cousin does not show that he was not still under the 
stress and excitement of the shooting. See, Br. Appe. at 38. 
Based on the record evidence and the applicable law cited herein and in Tiliaia's 
opening brief, the trial court erred in excluding Storm's statement. 
III. THE STATE HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN THAT THE 
PROSECUTOR'S MISSTATEMENT OF THE EVIDENCE WAS 
HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
It is the State's burden to show that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1373 and n.21 (Utah 1986). 
Further, all reasonable doubts must be resolved in the defendant's favor. State v. Eaton, 
569 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah 1977). Because the State incorrectly presumes that there was 
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no prosecutorial misconduct, it does not even attempt to meet this burden. Consequently, 
the State's argument on this point fails. 
Tiliaia's defense in this case was that after he and his friends left the house, 
Ezekiel House, who had demanded that Tiliaia give him the gun as they were walking 
outside (R503:196-97, 200), grabbed the gun and started shooting back toward the porch. 
There were many witnesses who all gave conflicting testimony regarding these events 
However, one fact that was clear from the evidence is that Tiliaia and his friends were all 
outside when they were then followed by several people who stayed on or near the porch 
as Tiliaia and his friends left.9 
Nonetheless, the prosecutor told the jury that as Tiliaia walked out the door, 
Zeke "went the other way. That is absolutely critical Lindsay (sic) told you [Tiliaia] 
went out of the house, the other guy came back in. They went in completely opposite 
directions." (R506:740) (emphasis added). Clearly, even Lindsey's notably inconsistent 
testimony (R503:182-184-86,190, 192-95, 213; R505:509, 512-17) does not support even 
9See9 e.g., R504:393 (Tiliaia and his friends were all pushed outside"); R503:128-
29 (Tiliaia left with three other men at the same time); R503:195-98 (Lindsey Isakson 
testified that Tiliaia and his friends left together); R503:129-30, 180, 196, 198, 206-07 
(after Tiliaia and his friends left, Joe Valdez walked to Kehndra to make sure she was 
okay, then Joe, Kehndra, Lindsey, and Shane Alvera followed Tiliaia and his companions 
out the door); R504:279-80 (Tiliaia and Zeke exited the residence together); R504:236 
(Shane Alvera saw Joe Valdez escort Tiliaia and Zeke to the door); R504:233, 267, 269 
(Tiliaia and Zeke left the house and "we all followed them out the door"); R505:577, 580-
81 (a black man with "poofy hair" and an afro with a pick in it (Zeke; see, R505.529, 532, 
551-52) jumped down the porch stairs "in a hurry", turned around and shot directly back 
toward the porch). 
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this misrepresentation of the facts. See, Br. Appe. at 40 (citing Lindsey's testimony that 
"[t]he guy [Zeke] was still in the house at the time when he [Tiliaia] had run out there." 
The State cites State v. Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, 113 P.3d 998, in support of 
what it characterizes as a prosecutor's ability to "summarize evidence and its inferences 
from his or her viewpoint." Br. Appe. at 41. However, there is a fundamental difference 
between summarizing evidence from one's viewpoint and creating facts favorable to 
one's position that the evidence does not support, which the prosecutor did here. 
Moreover, even the Larsen court emphasized the fact that "a prosecutor cannot 
allude to outside, unadmitted evidence" {Id. 1002), which is precisely what the prosecutor 
did in this case when she claimed that Zeke went back into the house and he and Tiliaia 
"went in completely opposite directions" (R506:740). 
This misrepresentation was critical because it went right to the heart of Tiliaia's 
defense. After several days of the jury hearing disputed facts and inconsistent testimony, 
the prosecutor made up her own version of events, telling the jury that Zeke not only went 
in the opposite direction from Tiliaia, but that he went back inside the house. This was 
patently false. The effect of this false evidence was to persuade the jury that Zeke could 
not have been the shooter, when based on the evidence, he could have been. 
Thus, not only is there a reasonable probability that the jurors were influenced by 
the prosecutor's statements, but the State simply cannot establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt that they were harmless. In addition to the many disputed facts and inconsistent 
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testimonies, many critical witnesses developed their recollections of events only after the 
passage of time and after comparing stories with others (see, e.g., R503:149-51, 190; 
R504:261-63; R505:523). Considering this inconsistent and disputed nature of the 
evidence, the prosecutor's misrepresentation about Zeke's inability to grab the gun was 
particularly misleading and harmful. Indeed, the State has not cited one case where a 
similarly blatant misconstruction of the evidence has been allowed. Br. Appe. 39-41.10 
Particularly in light of the serious nature of the charges in this case, the State 
cannot simply brush this prosecutorial misconduct aside. At the most fundamental level, 
Tiliaia was entitled to a fair trial, and the prosecutor's statements constituted misconduct 
and compromised that right. Therefore, this matter should be remanded for a new trial. 
IV. THE STATE HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN THAT THE 
PROSECUTOR'S INCORRECT INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE 
JURY'S ROLE WAS HARMLESS. 
It is universally recognized that statements made to inflame the passions and 
prejudices of the jury constitute misconduct. See, e.g., United States v Manning, 23 F.3d 
570, 574 (1st Cir. 1994); People of Territory of Guam v. Quichocho, 973 F.2d 723, 737 
(9th Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 1067 (1993); United States v. Duffaut, 314 F.3d 
10Because the State has summarily dismissed Tiliaia's related claims of ineffective 
assistance and plain error on the ground that the prosecutor's statement was not 
misconduct, Tiliaia relies upon his previous arguments and incorporates the same herein 
by reference. Br. Appt. 35-7, 38-40, 46-8. 
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203, 211 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1081, 1089 (5th Cir. 1991).11 
The prosecutor in this case told the jury that they were "selected to act as the 
voice and conscience of the community," and if they did not convict Tiliaia, "it is as true 
to say there has been no crime . . . please don't tell Kehndra Isakson that there's been no 
crime" (R506:747). Both of these statements, particularly the latter, were specifically 
designed to inflame the passions of the jury and to mislead them about their role as 
impartial triers of fact. Although they are sufficient, standing alone, to warrant remand 
for a new trial, the damage they caused was compounded by the prosecutor's 
misrepresentation of the evidence set forth in the previous section. 
In response to Tiliaia's claim of prosecutorial misconduct in this context, the 
State claims that defense counsel invited the improper and inflammatory statements by 
telling the jury that they could find the defendant "not guilty" either because they did not 
believe he had committed the crimes, or because the State had not met its burden of proof. 
Br. Appe. 44 (citing R506:735-36). 
The State makes a strange argument. Defense counsel's statements regarding 
the jury's role as impartial arbiters of fact and the State's burden of proof are true 
statements of the law. The jury in fact should have found Tiliaia "not guilty," if they 
uRather than respond to the law cited in Tiliaia's opening brief in support of his 
position (Br. Appt. 49), the State merely dismisses it as having "little relevance here." Br. 
Appe. 43. The State's argument is conclusory, neglecting to explain why the case law 
purportedly has "little relevance." Therefore, it should be ignored. 
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were going to, either because they believed he did not commit the crimes or because the 
State did not meet its burden of proof. On the other hand, it was improper for the jury to 
reach a "guilty" verdict because they were the "voice and conscience of the community," 
or because failing to do so would send a message that no crime had been committed. 
Therefore, it does not follow that proper statements regarding the jury's role 
"invited" an improper inflammatory response. Br. Appe. 44. It makes as much sense to 
say that appropriately arguing the evidence from one's point of view invites blatant 
misrepresentations about what the evidence is. 
Moreover, as argued in Tiliaia's opening brief, the trial court's ruling that these 
statements were what the State construes as "rhetorical" is erroneous and incorrect. Br. 
Appe. 44. Not only did the trial court conclude that the statements were merely argument, 
but she further concluded that they were not misstatements of the law (R506:750-51, 
754). These conclusions are incorrect, as noted above. Based on the law cited both in 
Tiliaia's opening brief and herein, the trial court incorrectly determined that the 
prosecutor's untrue statements were no different than what defense counsel said about a 
"not guilty" verdict, that the statements were just argument (R506:751-54). 
Further, the State cannot establish that the prosecutor's statements were harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt {State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d at 1373), particularly when all 
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reasonable doubts are resolved in Tiliaia's favor {State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d at 1116).12 
Therefore, this matter should be remanded for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and law, Mr. Tiliaia respectfully requests that his 
convictions be vacated and this matter remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this /, day of April, 2006. 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
1 / A / i 
Jennifer K. Gowans # 
Attorneys for Appellant 
12The State makes the conclusory statement that Tiliaia "fails to marshal the facts 
establishing the context of the comment"(Br. Appe. 45), but then neglects to cite what 
facts are not marshaled. Accordingly, Tiliaia does not address the State's unbriefed 
argument, particularly in light of the proper standard of review. See, Br Appt 2-3 
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